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Abstract 
By drawing on stakeholder-agency theory and the earnings management framework, we 
hypothesize a positive connection between corporate social responsibility and earnings 
management. We argue that earnings management damages the interests of stakeholders. 
Hence, managers who manipulate earnings can deal with stakeholder activism and vigilance 
by resorting to corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. Furthermore, CSR is a 
powerful tool that can be used to garner support from stakeholders and, therefore, provides 
an avenue for entrenchment to those managers that manipulate earnings, so as to reduce 
significantly their chances of being fired. Finally, we expect that the positive connection 
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance is negatively moderated 
when combined with earnings management practices. We demonstrate empirically our 
theoretical contention by making use of a database comprising 593 firms from 26 nations for 
the period 2002-2004. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting earnings are one of the most frequently cited performance statistics that 
are of major interest to external capital providers, suppliers, employees, customers, 
communities and regulators. Ideally, financial reporting helps the better-performing firms to 
distinguish themselves from poor performers and facilitates stakeholders to make financial 
decisions (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). However, managers can exercise some discretion in 
computing earnings, without violating generally accepted accounting principles, thereby 
causing reported incomes to appear either greater or lesser than they are in reality. In fact,  
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) define earnings management as managers exercising their 
discretion over the accounting numbers, and that this intervention in the external financial 
reporting process may be intended to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers (Healy and Wahlen, 1999: 368). 
In the absence of the potential for private benefits, rational managers would not 
engage in earnings management. Prior research on earnings management has identified three 
sets of incentives that spur this practice: capital markets, contractual arrangements, and 
regulatory motivations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). First, the evidence demonstrates that 
managers try to influence short-term prices, particularly around the time of certain types of 
corporate events like stock issues (DuCharme et al., 2004). Other authors, however, have 
suggested that managers may use their discretion to manage earnings in order to send private 
information to financial markets over future prospects for the firm. In effect, Ronen and 
Sadan (1981) developed a model in which earnings management is aimed at removing 
transitory items, allowing investors to predict better the expected earnings and cash flows. 
Second, other researchers have examined lending and compensation contracts, written in 
terms of accounting numbers, and have suggested that these contracts create incentives for 
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earnings management with a view to boosting bonus awards (e.g., Holthausen et al., 1995), 
improving job security (e.g., DeAngelo, 1988), and mitigating the potential violation of debt 
covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Finally, there are also regulatory motivations 
for earnings management. Managers of firms in regulated sectors suffer acute pressure from 
antitrust authorities regarding price controls and market shares. Such pressure stimulates 
earnings management practices as a stratagem to appear less profitable (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). In summary, the earnings management literature suggests that capital 
markets, contractual arrangements, and regulatory considerations induce firms to manage 
earnings.  
These deliberate managerial actions, contrived to disguise the real value of a firm’s 
assets, transactions, or financial position, have negative consequences for: shareholders; 
employees; the communities in which firms work; society at large; and managers’ 
reputations, job security and careers (Zahra et al., 2005). One of the most far-reaching 
consequences of actions like the manipulation of earnings is that the firm loses the support of 
stakeholders; this may lead to an increased activism and vigilance from shareholders and 
other affected stakeholder groups (Zahra et al., 2005: 818). The consequence is that the 
manager is under the threat of: rogue behaviour by employees; misunderstanding from 
customers; pressure from investors; defection from partners; legal action from regulators; 
boycotts from activists; illegitimacy from the community; and exposure from the media. 
Ultimately, these threats may destroy the firm’s reputation capital (Fombrun et al., 2000).  
As a defence against stakeholder activism and vigilance, which could cost a manager 
his job and damage the firm’s reputation, managers have all the incentives to compensate 
stakeholders through corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. CSR is related to ethical 
and moral issues concerning corporate decision-making and behaviour and, as such, 
addresses complex issues like environmental protection, human resources management, 
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health and safety at work, local community relations, and relationships with suppliers and 
customers (Castelo and Lima, 2006). Engaging in socially responsible activities not only 
improves stakeholder satisfaction, but also has a positive effect on corporate reputation. 
Disclosure of information about corporate behaviour and outcomes regarding social 
responsibility may help build a positive image among stakeholders (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
This positive image helps firms to establish community ties and become socially integrated 
and build reputation capital; hence, improving their ability to negotiate more attractive 
contracts with suppliers and governments, to charge premium prices for goods and services, 
and to reduce their cost of capital (Fombrun et al., 2000). Therefore, by resorting to CSR 
practices, the firm is able to gain support from its different stakeholders: employee 
commitment, customer loyalty, and collaboration from partners. Also, by the same token, the 
firm can obtain more favourable regulatory treatment, endorsements from activist groups, 
legitimacy from the community, and favourable coverage from the media (Castelo and Lima, 
2006), so as to avoid the eventual detrimental impact of government actions (Patten and 
Trompeter, 2003). 
Then, our basic conjecture is that, an executive who manipulates earnings has an 
incentive to project a socially-friendly image, given that CSR activities are a powerful tool 
for obtaining support from stakeholders. This, in turn, will reduce the likelihood of the 
manager being fired due to pressure from discontented shareholders or other stakeholders 
whose interests had been damaged by the implementation of earnings management practices. 
Under such a scheme, CSR is used as an entrenchment mechanism (Cespa and Cestone, 
2004) in the context of earnings manipulation. 
We prove our contention using an international database, composed of 593 firms 
from 26 nations, for the period 2002-2004. This result highlights the perverse effects of 
combining CSR with earnings management, calling into question some social demands on 
            
 5 
better-performing firms to devote part of their financial resources to improve their CSR. 
Accordingly, if these improvements are connected with earnings management practices, they 
may damage firms’ long-term wealth.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the most 
relevant literature related to the objectives of this work and develops the hypotheses. Section 
3 is methodological and describes the sample, variables and empirical models to be tested. 
The empirical results obtained are presented in Section 4. The final section of the article 
illustrates the main conclusions of this research and a discussion of the significance of the 
results. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Earnings management and corporate social responsibility 
Previous research (e.g., Davidson III et al., 2004) has established a relationship 
between earnings management and agency theory. These studies adopt, as their starting 
point, the traditional view that the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations, together with the existence of information asymmetries within firms, spawn the 
possibility of opportunistic actions by the agent (the manager) who may have different 
objectives from those of the principal (the owner), and thus pursue self-serving goals (the 
agency problem). In this context, earnings management is considered a type of agency cost 
because managers look after their own interests by releasing financial reports that do not 
present an accurate economic picture of the firm. As a consequence, shareholders could 
make non-optimal investment decisions (agency cost). Therefore, earnings management is 
related to agency theory because the former can create or exacerbate agency costs.  
However, earnings management not only affects a firm’s owners, it has an impact on 
stakeholders too. Stakeholders are considered a group that “bear some form of risk as a result 
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of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm” 
(Clarkson, 1995). This means that managerial actions like earnings management that mislead 
stakeholders as to the real value of firm’s assets, transactions, or financial position, have 
serious consequences for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society as a whole (Zahra 
et al., 2005). In a scenario when shareholders suspect earnings management, a firm 
immediately loses value on the stock market (Dechow and Sweeney, 1996). Predictably, this 
firm’s credit rating will then fall causing any bonds issued to lose value; this affects 
bondholders’ wealth. Similarly, banks may have lent money based on inflated income 
forecasts, thus making the recovery of loans problematic (DeFond and Jiambalbo, 1994). 
The employees are another stakeholder group affected by earnings management practices. 
D’Souza et al. (2000) studied the association between earnings management and labour costs 
and found that managers reduce reported earnings during labour union contract negotiations, 
relative to earnings released before and after contracts are negotiated, in order to reduce re-
negotiated labour costs. Finally, any reporting of numbers that do not reflect the true 
economic condition of a firm can also lead to a general lack of faith in the integrity of 
managers, and lead to the erosion in confidence in markets and the institutions, which in turn 
could have serious consequences for society as a whole (Zahra et al., 2005).  
As managerial decisions directly impact all stakeholders groups, the manager can be 
viewed as the stakeholders’ agent, and not just a shareholders’ agent (Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Jones, 1995). Adopting this stakeholder-agency perspective, a firm is conceived not as a 
bilateral relationship between shareholders and managers, but as a multilateral set of 
relationships amongst stakeholders. Each stakeholder has, in turn, their own interests, which 
generally are in conflict with those of the other stakeholders’. Certainly, one of the most 
important conflicts of interest occurs between managers and all other stakeholders; an 
amplified agency problem (Hill and Jones, 1992), which sometimes prevents stakeholders 
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from maximizing their utility. Because managers control the decision-making process in the 
firm, they may use this power to their own benefit, thereby causing significant losses to the 
rest of the stakeholders. In this context, stakeholders tend to articulate responses to thwart 
these detrimental consequences of management power. 
A primary response from stakeholders to such a manifestation of management power 
may be to punish management in an attempt to change this opportunistic behaviour (Rowley 
and Berman, 2000). Boycotts and lobbying are some of the examples of these actions 
(Baron, 2001; Feddersen and Gilligan, 2001; John and Klein, 2003). By wielding the threat 
of costly boycotts and media campaigns, stakeholders may enjoy substantial, although 
indirect, control over a firm. Complementary measures that may hinder managerial 
discretion are: employee unionization and activism, loss of confidence from customers, legal 
action from regulators, and the threat of defection from business partners (Castelo and Lima, 
2006). In this context, the media can amplify the effect of such actions, thus, contributing to 
the reduction in management abuse. Several studies have shown that the media has been 
particularly influential in corporate socially responsible responses (e.g., Bansal, 2005). The 
increased media coverage raises the firm’s visibility, causing public attention and scrutiny to 
be more severe. The threat of negative media publicity has two consequences for managerial 
practices (Bansal, 2005: 203). First, such publicity generates coercive pressure for firms to 
commit to sustainable development; threatening to erode the image of a firm that implements 
practices that the media considers unacceptable (e.g., Starbucks and its relationship with 
African coffee suppliers). And second, it can incite stakeholders to lobby organizations and 
governments in order to change business practices (e.g. the climate change lobby). In the 
specific case related to earnings management, some stakeholders have articulated specific 
responses. For example, shareholders and other stakeholders proactively seek reparations for 
the losses they have suffered (Zahra et al., 2005). Further, some companies are starting to 
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develop in-house whistle-blowing programs in which employees can disclose concerns about 
accounting and operational issues discreetly and anonymously (Murdock, 2003). 
In such a context, managers with capital markets, contractual, or regulatory 
motivations to manage earnings, may work to bolster their own job security by entrenching 
themselves and staying on in the job even if they are no longer competent or qualified to run 
the firm. A possible means of protecting their job (and maintaining private benefits) is by 
engaging in a broad array of activities that is aimed at developing relationships with 
corporate stakeholders and environmental activists, so-called corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), so as to gain support from these groups. CSR includes activities such as: 
incorporating social aspects into products and manufacturing processes; adopting 
progressive human resources practices; achieving improved environmentally-friendly ratings 
through recycling and pollution abatement; or by advancing the goals of community 
organizations (McWilliams et al., 2006). 
By means of CSR activities, the manager pursues different objectives to obtain: 
favourable coverage from the media; legitimacy from the community; favourable regulation; 
and less scrutiny from investors and employees. At the same time, such activity can reduce 
the likelihood of a firm’s products being boycotted while avoiding lobbying against the 
company. In essence, a manager believes that by satisfying stakeholders’ interests and 
projecting an image of social and environmental concern and awareness he can reduce the 
likelihood of being scrutinized by satisfied stakeholders for his management of earnings. 
Such strategic use of CSR brings into doubt the efficiency of implementing socially-
friendly policies as a corporate governance mechanism. This view differs from that provided 
by stakeholder theory by suggesting that stakeholder participation is an important way to: 
reinforce perceived legitimacy; increase the involvement of boards of directors; and to 
increase the scrutiny of top management. All these factors serve to enhance financial 
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performance (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). However, our proposal goes in line with some 
authors in the finance tradition that have questioned the positive effect of stakeholder 
orientation on corporate governance. Williamson (1993), Tirole (2001), and Jensen (2001) 
argue that agency problems between owners and managers are aggravated when managers 
act on behalf of non-shareholder stakeholders; especially since stakeholder orientation 
implies participation by different groups of constituencies in the decision-making process as 
well as a multiplicity of objectives of those who share corporate control. This problem will 
add significant costs to the decision-making process (delayed decisions, mutual distrust; 
Tirole, 2001). Therefore, control concentrated in the hands of just one stakeholder (i.e. 
shareholders) is preferable to that distributed among different stakeholders. 
A second argument that justifies the strategic use of CSR, by a manager who 
manipulates earnings, is connected to the implementation of entrenchment initiatives. From 
this viewpoint, concessions to social activists and pressure groups are simple self-
entrenchment strategies for incumbent CEOs who face pressure from shareholders whose 
interests will be damaged, in the medium-term, as a result of earnings management practices. 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that managers may reward stakeholders with generous 
social activities (CSR) as an entrenchment mechanism to avoid possible pressure from 
financial markets through hostile takeovers. Hence, we hypothesize that, when managers act 
in pursuit of private benefits by misleading others about the real value of the firm’s assets, 
transactions, or financial position, they may seek the connivance of different stakeholders to 
validate such practices. Stakeholders can be lured by offers that satisfy their specific interests 
and policies aimed at improving a firm’s CSR. 
Therefore, we expect that executives with incentives to manage earnings will be very 
proactive in boosting their public exposure through CSR activities, particularly in firms with 
high visibility (i.e. in regulated sectors). Alternatively, firms with low levels of earnings 
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management have fewer incentives to seek public exposure by promoting socially 
responsible activities. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that manage their earnings are more likely to have superior CSR 
ratings. 
 
2.2. Combining earnings management and corporate social responsibility and their 
impact on performance 
The second aspect that we address in this article refers to the impact of CSR activities 
on financial performance, triggered by earnings management practices. The instrumental 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) argues that good management implies 
positive relationships with key stakeholders, which, in turn, improve financial performance 
(Freeman, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997). The basic assumption behind this theory is 
that CSR may be an organizational device that leads to more effective use of resources 
(Orlitzky et al., 2003), which then has a positive impact on corporate financial performance 
(CFP). Hence, the strategic management of stakeholder relationships – an intangible asset – 
can be viewed as a means of improving financial performance by invoking the resource-
based theory of the firm (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Berman et al. (1999) also find support 
for the position that good stakeholder relationships have a direct positive effect on financial 
performance, a notion sometimes called the Good Management Hypothesis (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). 
The positive impact of CSR on CFP, however, has been questioned by various 
arguments. First, a short-sighted argument such that managers, especially those recently-
appointed and trying to acquire greater seniority, tend to pursue short-term policies that 
focus exclusively on financial results at the expense of long-term social issues (Preston and 
O’Bannon, 1997). Second, the management of relationships among a wide set of 
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stakeholders with conflicting objectives can result in an excessively rigid and resource-
consuming organization that may damage a firm’s financial performance (Aupperle et al., 
1985). Finally, managers may behave opportunistically, to the detriment of financial results, 
by following entrenchment practices (Jones, 1995) aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ 
interests, as we have detailed in the previous section. 
Along this line, we argue that when firms improve their CSR as a consequence of 
earnings management practices, the positive effect of CSR on CFP should be diminished 
significantly. This statement relies on the fact that managers who resort to accounting 
adjustments tend to over-invest in those activities that enhance a firm’s CSR, as an 
entrenchment strategy. Social concessions emerging from this strategy are unproductive and, 
because they are costly, are expected to have a marginal negative impact on financial 
performance. For example, a manager may over-invest in on-going, complex projects by 
employing different stakeholders to satisfy their interests and, at the same time, manage 
earnings in order to give these stakeholders large concessions. Rowley (1997) emphasizes 
that high levels of CSR may involve relationships with a wide set of stakeholders with 
conflicting objectives that could delay the decision-taking process in the organization. 
We hypothesize that a manager who engages in earnings management practices 
would attempt to involve as many stakeholders as possible, as a way to validate their actions 
and, hence, become indispensable (entrenchment strategy). This action leads to a reduction 
in the flexibility in the organization and affects its financial results detrimentally. 
Additionally, some authors remain skeptical about the supposed positive externalities caused 
by CSR. Friedman (1970) and Jensen (2001) argue that socially responsible initiatives are 
investments without pay-offs and, therefore, against the shareholder’s best interest.  
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The preceding discussion suggests that the level of earnings manipulation moderates 
negatively the connection between corporate social responsibility and profitability. Hence, 
our second hypothesis reads: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management will negatively moderate the relationship 
between CSR and CFP; the greater the level of earnings management the lesser the 
positive the effect of CSR on CFP. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Sample and Data 
Our sample is composed of 593 industrial firms included in the 2002-2004 SiRi 
ProTM database. This database is compiled by the Sustainable Investment Research 
International Company (SiRi) – the world’s largest company specialized in the analysis of 
socially responsible investment, and based in Europe, North America, and Australia. SiRi 
comprises eleven independent research institutions, such as KLD Research & Analytics Inc. 
in the USA and Centre Info SA in Switzerland, and provides detailed profiles of the leading 
international corporations. Companies are analyzed according to their reporting procedures, 
policies and guidelines, management systems, and key data. This information is extracted 
from financial accounts, company documentation, international databases, media reports, 
interviews with key stakeholders, and ongoing contact with management representatives. 
The profile of each firm contains over 350 data points that cover all major stakeholder issues 
such as community involvement, environmental impact, customer policies, employment 
relations, human rights issues, activities in controversial areas (e.g. alcohol), supplier 
relations, and corporate governance. 
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We complement these data on corporate responsibility with financial data from the 
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database for the year 2000 through 2005. The 
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database contains balance sheets, income statements, cash 
flow statements, and stock data, all of which have been standardized to accommodate the 
wide variety of financial accounting practices across countries and industries. The final 
sample is an incomplete panel data of 593 companies from 26 countries. In our sample, 
information on social issues is available across the three years under analysis (2002-2004) 
for 356 firms. 
3.2. Measures 
Earnings management. There are several ways to measure earnings management. 
Recent empirical studies in accounting and finance have used the approach that divides 
current accruals into their discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Following Jones 
(1991) and Dechow et al. (1995), we define current accruals as: 
 ( ) ( )Accruals CA Cash CL STD DEP= D - D - D -D -  [1] 
Where ? CA is the change in current assents; ? Cash is the change in cash; ? CL is the 
change in current liabilities; ?STD is the change in debt included in current liabilities; and 
DEP is the depreciation and amortization. 
Thereafter, we compute the expected accruals utilising an explanatory model (see the 
appendix for details). The differences between accruals and expected accruals are the 
unexplained or discretionary accruals (DA); this difference is a proxy for management 
discretion on reported earnings (Earn_manag). In particular, we adopt Kothari et al. (2005) 
in order to extract the effect of performance on computing the discretionary accruals1. The 
use of such an accrual measure enhances the reliability of inferences from earnings 
management studies with respect to discretionary accruals, as standard models (Jones and 
modified-Jones models) might be ill-specified because performance and estimated 
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discretionary accruals exhibit a mechanical relationship. Such an adjustment for performance 
eliminates, therefore, the criticism that is made in the earnings management literature, that 
discretionary accruals differences rely on differences in performance.  
Finally, in order to test the robustness of our results, in some specifications we have 
used a different variable to detect earnings manipulation. In particular, we study earnings 
management by focussing on the practice of income smoothing (Yeo et al, 2002; Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1995). Managers smooth earnings, as part of an entrenchment strategy, in order 
to ensure the stability of cash-flow streams so that they can satisfy the short-term interests of 
shareholders. The variable used (Income_smoothing), is defined as the correlation between 
changes in accruals and changes in cash flow within a four-year window. As the number of 
years in our sample is limited, we compute this variable using all available years from the 
COMPUSTAT Global Vantage database (1995-2004). 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This was notoriously difficult to 
operationalize in the past (Waddock and Graves, 1997), because it is a multidimensional 
construct (Carroll, 1979) that should capture a wide range of items; ideally, one for each 
relevant stakeholder (Waddock and Graves, 1997). We use SiRi ProTM data, which includes 
eight research fields. The first one provides a general overview of a company and the last 
field reports the level of involvement in so-called controversial business activities. The 
remaining sections are devoted to measuring the extent of a firm’s responsibilities to its 
stakeholders: community, corporate governance (shareholders), customers, employees, 
environment, and vendors and contractors. In Appendix 2, we show the items that are used to 
compute the score for a particular type of stakeholder, the workers. Similar items are used to 
compute the score for other stakeholders2. The scores for each item are rated by the SiRi 
analysts on scales ranging from 0 (worst) to 100 (best) by taking into consideration four 
criteria: transparency, principles, management and operations. Importantly, each information 
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item is weighted according to a methodology which is sector-specific, developed by SiRi. 
For each sector, SiRi’s analysts determine the firm’s potential negative impact on each 
stakeholder item and assign weightings in proportion. Firms in the same sector are subjected 
to the same weighting scheme. Firms in other sectors use different schemes. For example, 
for energy companies, the items related to “environment” are assigned a heavier weighting 
than for companies in the financial services industry. The final score provided by SiRi is the 
weighted sum of each of the scores by its corresponding weight. In this study, we use that 
score and we detract the component that corresponds to shareholders. We do not consider 
such stakeholders in order to preclude the existence of endogeneity problems between our 
proxy of CSR and some explanatory variables that are closely connected to a firm’s financial 
performance. 
In order to test the moderating effect of earnings management on the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance (Hypothesis 2), in some specifications, we define 
the multiplicative variable DEarn_Manag*CSR, where DEarn_manag that is equal to 1 
when Earn_manag is larger than the mean for the corresponding sector year and country. 
Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). We use return on assets (ROA), which is 
the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to the total values of assets. We rely on 
accounting measures because they are more sensitive to managers’ manipulations than 
market measures. As pointed out by Orlitzky et al. (2003: 408), “indicators such as ROA and 
ROE are subject to managers’ discretionary allocations of funds to different projects and 
policy choices, and thus reflect internal decision-making capabilities and managerial 
performance rather than external market responses to organizational actions”. 
This variable is used as a dependent one to test Hypothesis 2 and as an explanatory 
one to test the robustness of Hypothesis 1. In the latter case, we want to ensure that earnings 
management practices still have a positive influence on CSR after we detract the effect of a 
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firm’s financial performance. We are particularly interested in analyzing the link between 
earnings management and CSR, net of the effect of CFP, because it may well be the case that 
earnings management determines financial performance and the latter, in turn, affects  CSR 3. 
Under this scheme, the effect of earnings management on CSR would vanish once we 
incorporate in our estimations a financial performance variable. Thus, according to this view, 
entrenchment does not take place and  CSR is simply the consequence of increases in 
financial performance due to earnings management. 
Control variables. In order to investigate whether there is an entrenchment motive 
that justifies the connection between earnings management and socially responsible 
behavior, in some specifications we define a dummy variable for entrenchment 
(Dentrenchment). In doing so,  we follow the specification shown in De Miguel et al. (2004) 
and estimate a variable for performance (the return on assets) in terms of managerial 
ownership; both quadratic and cubic terms. As controls, we incorporate size, leverage and 
investment, as defined below. The results show that the relationship between performance 
and managerial ownership decreases in the range between 21% and 81%. Hence, we define 
the aforementioned dummy (Dentrenchment) as equal to 1 when managerial ownership is 
between 21% and 81% and zero otherwise. When managerial stake lies between these two 
numbers, a manager has sufficient power to trigger entrenchment initiatives without having 
to bear 100% of the corresponding costs. Also, we cross this variable with the 
aforementioned that characterizes earnings management (Dentrench*Earn_manag) in order 
to investigate whether the effect of earnings management on the definition of a firm’s CSR is 
more pronounced in those situations when managers are set on entrenchment. 
Also, it is important to eliminate the different sources of spurious correlation 
described in the literature. First, intangible resources generated by R&D investments make a 
firm’s technology more flexible, thereby allowing the incorporation of customer preferences 
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into the design of goods produced. This factor improves customer satisfaction and, 
consequently, the firm’s CSR. At the same time, several studies show that R&D investments 
favor the management of earnings to achieve certain goals (Baber et al., 1991; Clinch, 1991; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991). Thus, we introduce as a control, R&D_intensity, which is the 
ratio of R&D expenditures to total revenues. Second, an alternative channel that connects 
earnings management with CSR is ownership structure. Companies owned by large 
blockholders have both larger levels of CSR and a higher likelihood of managing earnings. 
For example, Carlson and Bathala (1997) show that earnings management practices are 
present particularly in those firms with institutional ownership. Concomitantly, Neubaum 
and Zahra (2006) find that long-term institutional owners, who tend to be controlling 
blockholders, affect positively a firm’s CSR. Hence, we propose two variables of ownership 
in order to eliminate a possible spurious correlation due to ownership structure. The variable, 
Ownership_concentration, is the sum of the stakes of the three largest blockholders. We 
complement this variable with another that captures the presence of institutional 
blockholders (Institut_ownership), which is the stake in the hands of financial institutions. 
The final channel that may explain the connection between earnings management and 
CSR is: managerial risk preferences. Managers who are risk averse tend to smooth earnings. 
Also, these managers tend to collude with other stakeholders (satisfying their interests) or 
collude with other firms (Spagnolo, 2005) as a way of diminishing the overall volatility of a 
firm’s structural parameters. In our study, the managers’ risk profile is studied indirectly 
through a variable of a firm’s risk, given that managerial risk attitudes are translated into 
specific policies that determine the firm’s overall risk exposure. As a measure of Risk we use 
the betas as reported in COMPUSTAT Global Vantage (e.g., Hillman and Keim, 2001).  
The remaining controls are standard for the literature that studies the connection 
between variables of financial performance and social performance. (Waddock and Graves, 
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1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001): Size is approximated using total revenues, which is widely 
recognized as a determinant of a firm’s financial and social responsibility. For financial 
structure, we use two variables: Leverage which is the ratio of total debt to the total value of 
assets, and financial resources, which is calculated as the ratio of cash-flow to total assets. 
3.3. Methodology 
We test our hypotheses making use of two basic specifications: one explains CSR and 
the other explains CFP. The main independent variable in both cases is the earnings 
management variable. In both specifications, we consider the same set of control variables in 
explaining financial performance as well as social responsibility. In particular, in order to 
explain CSR and test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we rely on the following regression: 
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 [2] 
Hypothesis is supported when 2l  is positive and significant. Additionally, in some 
specifications we add the Dentrench*Earn_manag as well as the Dentrench variable, defined 
before, in order to test the marginal effect of earnings management on CSR in a managerial 
entrenchment situation. According to our theoretical framework, we would expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient of such a variable. 
The second specification is aimed at explaining financial performance. As mentioned 
before, we employ the same control variables as in specification [2] and the earnings 
management variable. Additionally, in accordance with the instrumental stakeholder theory,  
CSR is treated as a predictor variable. Finally, in order to identify whether or not 
discretionary accruals moderate the connection between CSR and financial performance, we 
use the aforementioned interaction variable (DEarn_Manag*CSR). Hence, the specification 
is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3 is confirmed when the coefficient of the interaction term 4b  is negative 
and significant. 
In both specifications [2] and [3], we use fixed-effect estimations in order to prevent 
endogeneity problems, relying on the eventual correlation between the fixed unobservable 
component of the error term and some explanatory variables. In particular, we expect the 
unobserved determinants of CSR, like a firm’s organization, to be perfectly correlated with a 
firm’s CFP. Thus, we have to estimate in differences (fixed-effect estimation)4. 
Additionally, we lag some independent variables by one period to prevent endogeneity 
problems that are not linked to the constant unobservable heterogeneity. In particular, we lag 
the variable CFP by one period when estimating CSR (see equation [2]) because 
instrumental stakeholder theory establishes that the latter variable is a determinant of CFP. 
Regarding the specification of CFP (see equation [3]) we lag the variable for CSR because, 
as mentioned in the theoretical section, readily available financial resources may affect a 
firm’s CSR – Slack Resources Hypothesis (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Also, in 
specification [3] we lag the variable for Discretionary Accruals, as well as the interaction 
term (Earn_Manag*CSR,) because bad financial results may trigger earnings manipulations. 
Finally,, in both specifications we lag two control variables: Leverage and Risk because debt 
capacity (closely related to risk) as well as overall firm risk are determined by a firm’s 
financial and social results.  
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4. RESULTS 
Table 1A reports means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values. The 
descriptive analysis shows that the CSR variable shows a mean value of 47% on a scale 
between 0 and 100. Among the countries with the largest scores are: Luxembourg (72.64%); 
Taiwan (62.09%); Finland (60.52%); Denmark (58.84%); Norway (57.91%); Canada 
(56.58%); Austria (56.23%) and UK (55.63%). The worst performers are Mexico (27.95%); 
Singapore (27.08%) and Greece (26.64%), with the US (45.18%) slightly below the mean5. 
By sector, the highest ratings (54.14%) correspond to those with a 1digit SIC equal to 1 
(Metal mining; Oil & Gas Field Exploration Services and General Building Contractors) and 
the worst (37.34%) correspond to those with a 1digit SIC equal to 7 (hotel services, 
recreation services). Within the regulated sectors, water supply and gas return a score much 
higher than the mean (57.58%), while the score for the telecommunication sector is closer to 
the mean (48.32%). Also, when we turn our attention to the Earn_manag variable, we find 
that discretionary accruals are larger (0.012) than the overall mean (-0.010), in regulated 
sectors (water, gas and electric services –2-digit SIC code=49). In the following analysis, we 
show that the connection between earnings management and CSR is more significant in 
regulated sectors. 
The analysis of the correlation matrix6 (see Table 1B) shows that variations in 
earnings management show a positive correlation with variations in CSR (12%). This is also 
true for the variable that crosses earnings management with entrenchment 
(Dentrench*Earn_manag), which indicates that variations in earnings management 
practices, in a situation of eventual entrenchment, is positively correlated with variations in 
CSR. This correlation conforms to Hypothesis 1. Also in Table 1B, we observe that 
variations in discretionary accruals are positively correlated to variations in financial 
performance. This is consistent with the idea that managers manipulate earnings in order to 
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boost profits. Finally, we also find a positive correlation between variations in CSR and 
variations in CFP (4.8%). Remarkably, this correlation is much lower when the degree of 
earnings management is high (DEarn_manag=1) rather than low (2.33% versus 9.4%). This 
finding is in line with Hypothesis 2. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1A and 1B about here 
------------------------------- 
The analysis of specifications [2] is performed in Table 2A, while some robustness 
checks are conducted in Tables 2B and 2C respectively. More specifically, in Table 2A, we 
test the effect of a firm’s earnings ma nagement practices on CSR (Hypothesis 1). Also, we 
study the significance of this effect by incorporating CFP as an additional predictor for 
discretionary accruals (column 3). In column 1 we test the direct effect of discretionary 
accruals on CSR. Results indicate that the effect of earnings management practices on social 
responsibility is positive and significant ( 0.836b = , .01p < ), thus providing support for 
Hypothesis 1. Also, in column 2 we investigate whether this effect is greater in a situation 
where we expect managerial entrenchment. We find that this is the case when the coefficient 
of Dentrench*Earn_manag is positive (0.676, significant at p>.05). Hence, earnings 
management, as a managerial device to avoid stakeholder pressure, leads to improvements in 
CSR. Given that such practices may not only damage stakeholders’ interests but those of 
shareholders as well, a manager may satisfy stakeholders’ interests as an entrenchment 
mechanism in order to develop alliances with stakeholders as a defence against restive 
shareholders. This entrenchment motive that spurs improvements in a firm’s CSR is 
supported in our analysis. Finally, we confirm these results by introducing a variable for 
financial performance (column 3). This obviates the possibility of establishing a spurious 
connection between earnings management and CSR through a firm’s financial performance. 
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Concerning the rest of variables, as expected, we find that CSR is positively related to size 
and risk. 
In column 4, we investigate whether a manager starts to increase CSR one period in 
advance, in anticipation of earnings management.  To do so, we consider the mean value of 
CSR, between period t and t-1, as a dependent variable. The result, although less significant, 
also holds for this specification. Although there is a case for the anticipation argument, it is 
not very significant. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2A about here 
---------------------------------------- 
In Table 2B, we investigate the robustness of our results when we compare regulated 
(water, gas, electric services, telecommunications) versus non-regulated sectors (columns 1 
and 2). The results show that the positive impact of earnings management on CSR is more 
significant in regulated sectors. This is consistent with the idea that these are politically 
sensitive sectors where stakeholder power is particularly high. Finally, in columns 3 and 4, 
we compare Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-Saxon countries7. We find that the effect is 
more important in Anglo-Saxon countries. This can be explained by more vigorous 
stakeholders’ activism in such countries. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2B about here 
---------------------------------------- 
In table 2C, we extend our robustness analysis and focus on a particular type of 
earnings manipulation; income smoothing. Columns 1 and 2 show that this variable has a 
positive impact on CSR that holds when we take into account the specification for the 
variable for discretionary accruals (Earn_manag in column 2). Finally, in columns 3 and 4, 
we limit our analysis to two particular types of stakeholders: customers and workers. We 
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choose these two types of blockholders because they are among the most salient. The results 
are robust for these stakeholders too. Remarkably, in an unreported estimation, when we 
focus on other stakeholders that have less power (suppliers, the community), the results do 
not hold. This behavior conforms to the scenario where a manager, who has manipulated 
earnings, seeks to reinforce relationships with stakeholders. His primary objective will be to 
look after the interests of the most important stakeholders. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2C about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The results from the estimation of specification [3], to contrast Hypothesis 2, are 
presented in Table 3. We use the aforementioned variable (Dearman_Manag*CSR) to test 
the moderating role of discretionary accruals in the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance. Using that variable, we focus on the moderating role when the degree of 
earnings management is high enough. In line with our theory, we expect that the coefficient 
of such variable to be negative; suggesting that generous social concessions, defrayed 
through accounting manipulation, reduces the positive effect of CSR on financial 
performance. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The results in column 3 of Table 3 show that the coefficient for CSR is positive 
( .05p < ) whereas for the interaction term it is negative and significant ( .05p < ). 
Remarkably, the total effect of CSR on CFP, even when there is earnings manipulation, is 
still positive (0.058-0.048=0.01). These results provide support for Hypothesis 2 concerning 
the negative moderating effect of earnings management practices in the relationship between 
CSR and CFP. It is remarkable that the direct effect of the earnings management variable is 
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positive in the contemporaneous specification ( 0.46b = , .01p <  column 1), given that 
earnings management practices are aimed at improving financial performance. However, 
when we lag this variable by one period (column 2), we find that these practices have a 
negative impact on financial performance. This finding suggests that earnings management 
practices are effective only in the short-term but not in the medium-term (one period ahead), 
which is precisely one of the reasons why managers develop CSR activities as an 
entrenchment mechanism. 
Turning our attention to the rest of variables, we find that financial performance 
increases with financial resources. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and earnings management practices. We defend the thesis that managers manipulate 
earnings in order to obtain private benefits, and through this practice damage the interests of 
stakeholders. As stakeholders exert pressure on firm decisions, managers may internalize the 
negative impact of their actions and work to compensate these constituencies through 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Predictably, by colluding with non-
shareholders stakeholders, a manager is able to obtain: employee commitment, customer 
loyalty, collaboration from partners, more favourable regulation, endorsements from activist 
groups, legitimacy from the community, favourable coverage from the media and the 
capacity of influence some public policies. As a consequence, the projection of an image of 
social and environmental concern and awareness allows management to reduce the 
likelihood of earnings management practices being scrutinized by the firm’s stakeholders. 
Therefore, we hypothesized a positive association between earnings management practices 
and CSR activities. 
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To demonstrate our theoretical contention, we make use of an international database 
provided by the Sustainable Investment Research International Company that scrutinizes 
firms with respect to their practices toward employees, communities, suppliers, customers, 
environment, and corporate governance. Empirical results confirm the existence of a positive 
relationship between both variables. After we control for different variables that may justify 
the existence of a spurious correlation (intangible resources, ownership structure and firm’s 
risk), we see that firms that manage  earnings show superior levels of CSR. We note that this 
result particularly clear in those situations where the literature shows that managerial 
entrenchment is more likely. We explain this result because managers who indulge in 
earnings management practices have two reasons to satisfy stakeholders’ interests. First, a 
pre-emptive reason: managers anticipate that stakeholder activism in case of earnings 
manipulation may damage their position in the firm. A good way of avoiding such activism 
is by satisfying stakeholders’ interests. Second, an entrenchment reason: managers tend to 
collude with other stakeholders as a hedging strategy against disciplinary initiatives from 
shareholders,  whose long-term interests may be damaged by these earnings management 
practices. 
The second result that we find is that the connection between earnings management 
and CSR is robust to the inclusion of variables like financial performance. This result 
suggests that the linkage between earnings management and CSR is not explained through 
the effect that these practices have on a firm’s CFP. A firm’s CSR can be increased, not only 
by inflated financial results, but also by the set of pre-emptive and entrenchment initiatives 
aimed to satisfy stakeholders’ interests. Additionally, we conduct a set of robustness checks 
and the results hold for different specifications, different measures of earnings manipulation 
like income smoothing, as well as for particular types of stakeholders (workers and 
customers). Also, consistent with our theory, the results are more significant in those 
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politically sensitive sectors (regulated) and in Anglo-Saxon legal-origin countries, where we 
expect stakeholder activism to be more pronounced. 
Finally, we demonstrate that the combination of earnings management practices and 
CSR activities is costly for the firm as the increase of social concessions to stakeholders, 
justified by means of earnings manipulation, has a marginal negative impact on financial 
performance. In other words, we find that the connection between social and financial 
performance is weaker in a context with high levels of earnings management. 
 
5.1 Implications for Research 
This work is a bridge between the corporate governance literature and stakeholder 
theory. According to the latter line of research, the management of stakeholders is a device 
to improve financial results (Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995), whereas corporate 
governance emphasizes the difficulty in reconciling the demands of a wide set of 
stakeholders (Jensen, 2001; Tirole, 2001). Thus, a desirable objective would be to define 
some criteria that distinguishes those situations where improvements in CSR are aimed at 
increasing financial performance, from those situations where the objective is managerial 
entrenchment. These latter situations have been dealt with in previous studies like those by 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Cespa and Cestone (2004). These authors connect social 
concessions to workers as an entrenchment strategy formulated to avoid takeovers.  
Our main result is that the implementation of earnings management practices is a key 
element that distinguishes between both types of situation. Accounting performance 
manipulations are associated with the entrenchment dimension of a firm’s CSR. Thus, 
shareholders should be aware that some improvement in CSR may simply be the 
consequence of managerial accounting manipulation. When this happens, a firm’s financial 
performance is damaged significantly. 
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5.2 Policy implications 
The conclusions derived from this study are important for both investors and public 
authorities. Investors should not take for granted that firms with a large CSR behave fairly. 
Our results show that these firms may very likely be involved in earnings management 
practices. Also, public authorities should be aware that a firm’s CSR is the outcome of 
different investments by the firm. Thus, promoting a specific type of socially responsible 
behaviour may result in inefficient over-investment in such activities. This situation may be 
accompanied, as we find, by malpractices like earnings management. 
5.3 Future research 
A natural extension of our work is to focus on more specific dimensions of a firm’s 
CSR, in order to identify the most relevant stakeholders that a firm particularly cares about 
when it manages its earnings. We provide some evidence in this direction given that 
customers and workers could be crucial target stakeholders for any manager set on 
entrenchment. However, further analysis is needed; particularly in the evolution along time 
of the earnings management-CSR linkage once more annual information on social issues is 
available. Also, it may be worth conducting this fine grained analysis differentiating by 
sectors and institutional frameworks. Another extension that we hardly explore in this paper 
is ownership structure. We expect a different connection between CSR and earnings 
management when the large blockholders are institutions instead of individuals. Finally, the 
development of richer predictive models of earnings manipulation that incorporate aspects 
like social responsibility is a natural objective that should be addressed in our future 
research. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 In particular, we introduce the variable of ROA as an explanatory variable of the predicted accruals. This is a 
way to eliminate the effect of performance from the unpredicted accruals (see the appendix for more details). 
2 Visit www.centreinfo.ch/doc/doc_site/SP-Novartis-06.pdf for an example of a detailed profile, and visit 
www.ais.com.es/ingles/productos/derivados.htm#1 for more information on SiRi ProTM. 
3 The central argument draws on a stream of stakeholder theory called slack resources hypothesis (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997) that connects greater CFP to a surplus of resources that gives firms the necessary financial 
wherewithal to attend to social issues (McGuire et al. 1988, 1990; Kraft and Hage, 1990; and Preston et al., 
1991). 
4 In order to control for temporal, sectoral and country effects in fixed-effect estimation, we detract from each 
dependent variable its mean value for the corresponding year, sector and country. 
5 Our sample is composed of 26 different nations, being the most representative US (31.26%); UK (15.37%); 
Japan (8.51%); France (7.75%); Switzerland (7.37%); Germany (5.97%); Netherlands (4.96%); Sweden 
(3.68%); Italy (2.92%); and Canada (1.91%).  
6 For the sake of consistency with the estimations, we show the correlations of differences in the variables. 
Note that in fixed-effect estimations, variables are taken as differences between periods. 
7 We follow La Porta et al (1998) and separate the countries by those with French, German, Scandinavian and 
Anglo-Saxon-legal origin. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, Thailand, UK and US fall within 
the latter category 
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Appendix 1: Earnings Management 
The estimation of earnings management is made through discretionary accruals 
(DA). These are computed by detracting the expected or non-discretionary accruals (NDA) 
from the total accruals (TA). We use the Kothari et al (2005) model to estimate DA and 
NDA. This model departs from the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. 
(1995), and incorporates a non-deflated constant term as well as a term that captures 
performance (ROA). In particular, in the modified Jones model total accruals are estimated 
in terms of changes in sales minus receivables (? (Sales-Receivables)) and property, plant 
and equipment (PPE). All these variables including the constant are deflated by lagged total 
assets (At-1). We estimate each year cross-sectionally and by considering a 1-digit SIC code. 
Moreover, as we make use of an international database, it is normal to find large differences 
in the level of earnings management across countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Unfortunately, we 
do not have enough observations for each country and we cannot separate the analysis 
country-by-country. We employ a solution that includes in its specifications a set of country 
dummy variables. This estimation strategy has been used in several papers (Kang and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; Han and Wang, 1998). Due to all these reasons, and considering 
the number of sectors (10) and countries (26) in our data, we propose the following 
specification for estimating NDA for firm i in sector s and year t: 
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 [A.1] 
Country sets are dichotomous variables that capture country effects. The expected 
portion of total accruals, the non-discretional component, is calculated using the regression 
coefficients from equation [A.1]:  
            
 35 
 
( )
, ,
, 0, 1, 2, 3,
, 1 , 1 , 1
30
4, , , ,
5
( Re )1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
i st i st
i s t st st st st
i s t i s t i s t
st i st j s t i st
j
Sales ceivables PPE
NDA
A A A
ROA Country
a a a a
a a
- - -
=
æ ö æ ö æ öD -
= + + +ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø è ø
+ + å
 [A.2] 
From the non-discretionary accruals, NDA, we compute the discretionary accruals, 
DA, as follows:  
 ,, ,
, 1
i st
i st i st
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æ ö
= -ç ÷
è ø
 [A.3] 
 
In this model, the change in sales minus receivables is used to control for firm 
growth since working capital is closely related to sales, while PPE is used to control for 
depreciation expenses contained in accruals. Finally, the variable of ROA detracts the effect 
of performance in explaining differences in accruals. As a result, NDA are the expected 
accruals given the firm’s growth, performance and fixed assets, while DA represents the 
unexpected accruals, which is our proxy for Earn_Manag. 
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Appendix 2: 
Description of the Items for Computing the Score of Employees’ Satisfaction (Nestle) a 
Score Weight 
Weighted 
score Weight 
Weighted 
score 
Stakeholder (j)  Items (i ) 
ijS  ijW  ij ijS W´  
ij
iji
W
Wå
 ij
ij
iji
W
S
W
´
å
 
        
D Separate employee report 100.0 0.010 1.020 0.060 6.000 
D Employee information on website 100.0 0.003 0.340 0.020 2.000 
D Employee information in annual report 100.0 0.010 1.020 0.060 6.000 
D Policies/Principles regarding employees 100.0 0.003 0.340 0.020 2.000 
D Description of employee benefits programmes 100.0 0.003 0.340 0.020 2.000 
D Disclosure of quantitative data 70.0 0.003 0.238 0.020 1.400 
P Formal policy statement on health and safety 80.0 0.007 0.544 0.040 3.200 
P Formal policy on diversity/employment equity 80.0 0.007 0.544 0.040 3.200 
P Formal policy on freedom of association 80.0 0.007 0.544 0.040 3.200 
P Formal policy statement on child/forced labour 100.0 0.003 0.340 0.020 2.000 
Employees 
P Formal policy statement on working hours 80.0 0.007 0.544 0.040 3.200 
 P Formal policy statement on wages 80.0 0.003 0.272 0.020 1.600 
 M Board responsibility for human resources issues  100.0 0.005 0.510 0.030 3.000 
M Specific health and safety targets  30.0 0.005 0.156 0.031 0.918 
M Diversity/Equal opportunity programs  40.0 0.005 0.204 0.030 1.200 
M Work/Life programs  40.0 0.005 0.204 0.030 1.200 
M Training programs  80.0 0.005 0.408 0.030 2.400 
M Participative management programs  40.0 0.005 0.204 0.030 1.200 
M Systems for collective labour negotiations 40.0 0.005 0.204 0.030 1.200 
M Cash profit sharing programs  0.0 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.000 
M Ownership programs  40.0 0.003 0.100 0.015 0.588 
M Regular employee satisfaction surveys 80.0 0.005 0.408 0.030 2.400 
M Specific employment related indicators 80.0 0.005 0.408 0.030 2.400 
C Total workplace time lost 30.0 0.002 0.069 0.014 0.406 
C Health and safety fines 50.0 0.002 0.115 0.014 0.676 
C Employee satisfaction 40.0 0.005 0.208 0.031 1.224 
C Supervisory Board (NEDs) 80.0 0.002 0.184 0.014 1.082 
C Management (EDs) 0.0 0.002 0.000 0.014 0.000 
C Quality of industrial relations 60.0 0.005 0.270 0.026 1.588 
C Subsidiaries with social certification 0.0 0.005 0.000 0.030 0.000 
C Major recent lay-offs 50.0 0.005 0.225 0.026 1.324 
C Health and safety incidents 50.0 0.005 0.225 0.026 1.324 
 
C Freedom of association 50.0 0.005 0.225 0.026 1.324 
 C Discrimination 50.0 0.005 0.225 0.026 1.324 
 C Child/Forced Labour 100.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
C Restructuring 30.0 0.005 0.135 0.026 0.794 
C Employment conditions 0.0 0.005 0.000 0.026 0.000 
 EMPLOYEES SCORE     63.371 
       
 
 
 _ _ ij ijijSiRi total score S W= ´å    71.432    
a D stands for “Disclosure”; P stands for “Policies and principles”; M stands for “Management procedures”, 
and C stands for “Controversies within the relationship with each stakeholder”. 
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TABLE 1A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max 
      
CSR 1105 47.442 14.998 0.779 80.140 
ROA 1105 4.565 8.856 -114.601 28.136 
Earn_manag 1105 -0.010 0.144 -1.901 1.481 
DEarn_Manag*CSR 1105 -1.695 5.202 -26.585 23.393 
Dentrenchment 1105 0.012 0.108 0.000 1.000 
Dentrench*Earn_manag 1105 -0.001 0.018 -0.414 0.105 
Income_smoothing 873 0.103 0.606 -0.993 0.998 
R&D_intensity 1105 41.187 113.077 0.000 896.687 
Ownership_concentration 1105 15.290 6.950 3.130 100.000 
Institut_ownership 1105 2.571 6.100 0.000 89.650 
Risk 1105 1.046 0.762 -0.439 5.164 
Size 1105 18403.810 32582.880 40.103 303756.000 
Leverage 1105 24.121 15.667 0.000 91.460 
Financial_Resources 1105 0.587 0.461 0.073 5.007 
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TABLE 1B: Correlations Matrix a 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CSR 1 1.000              
CFP 2 0.048 1.000             
Earn_manag 3 0.122* 0.071* 1.000            
Dentrench*Earn_manag 4 0.088* 0.026 -0.030 1.000           
DEarn_Manag*CSR 5 0.297* -0.090* -0.040 -0.003 1.000          
Income_smoothing 6 0.051 0.030 -0.017 0.019 0.027 1.000         
Dentrenchment 7 -0.025 -0.021 0.018 -0.351* 0.055* -0.005 1.000        
R&D_intensity 8 0.124* 0.015 0.026 0.026 0.003 0.009 -0.008 1.000       
Ownership_concentration 9 -0.118* -0.014 -0.060* 0.000 0.015 0.022 -0.016 -0.012 1.000      
Institut_ownership 10 -0.034 0.029 -0.047* 0.014 0.016 0.047 -0.053* 0.014 0.287* 1.000     
Risk 11 0.097* -0.044* 0.070* 0.021 0.019 -0.044 -0.049* -0.002 0.035 -0.044* 1.000    
Size 12 0.194* 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.089* 0.010 -0.014 -0.020 -0.014 -0.038 -0.061* 1.000   
Leverage 13 -0.025 -0.204* 0.080* -0.066* -0.015 -0.042 0.020 0.011 0.045* 0.016 0.0950* -0.054* 1.000  
Financial_Resources 14 -0.074 0.099* 0.015 0.042* -0.002 -0.021 0.004 -0.043* 0.023 0.014 -0.042* -0.053* 0.038 1.000 
a * Means that the correlation is significant at 10% level. 
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TABLE 2A: Estimation of CSR on Financial Performance and Discretionary Accruals a 
Table 2A shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables 
defined in the text. In column 4 the dependent variable is the average value of CSR between period t and t-1.  
Dependent Variable CSR CSR CSR Average CSR 
CFP(t-1)   0.066* 
(1.720) 
0.047 
(1.520) 
Earn_manag 0.836*** 
(2.370) 
0.704** 
(1.870) 
0.689** 
(1.930) 
0.495* 
(1.720) 
Dentrench*Earn_manag  0.676** 
(1.960) 
0.683** 
(1.990) 
0.443* 
(1.600) 
Dentrenchment  5.291 
(1.460) 
4.968 
(1.390) 
4.942* 
(1.710) 
R&D_intensity 1.189 
(1.170) 
1.283 
(1.250) 
1.177 
(1.160) 
1.081 
(1.320) 
Ownership_concentration -0.137 
(-0.470) 
-0.192 
(-0.660) 
-0.161 
(-0.560) 
-0.284 
(-1.220) 
Institut_ownership 0.072 
(1.290) 
0.080 
(1.320) 
0.072 
(1.290) 
0.069 
(1.530) 
Risk(t-1) 0.943 
(1.480) 
1.158* 
(1.750) 
1.096* 
(1.720) 
1.002** 
(1.960) 
Size 4.670*** 
(2.760) 
4.493*** 
(2.610) 
4.514*** 
(2.670) 
4.375*** 
(3.220) 
Leverage 0.341 
(0.350) 
0.303 
(0.310) 
0.648 
(0.650) 
0.357 
(0.440) 
Financial_resources -2.436 
(-0.220) 
-1.558 
(-0.140) 
-11.580 
(-0.960) 
-5.551 
(-0.570) 
Constant -0.917** 
(-2.290) 
-0.642 
(-1.140) 
-1.418*** 
(-2.940) 
-1.141*** 
(-2.940) 
Number of observations 1105 1105 1105 1105 
2R  4.46% 4.52% 4.96% 3.97% 
Fitness Test 2.11 (0.030) 1.87 (0.035) 2.21 (0.01) 2.56 (0.003) 
Hausman Test 14.79 (0.060) 23.54 (0.023) 19.01 (0.061) 25.53 (0.020) 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses. 
  * p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
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TABLE 2B: Robustness –Regulated Sectors; Anglo-Saxon Countries- 
Table 2B shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables 
defined in the text. In column 1, we focus on regulated sectors (water supply, gas supply, electric services, 
telecommunication), while in column 2 the results are from the remaining sectors. Column 3 focuses on 
Anglo-Saxon counties as defined in La Porta et al (1998) (e. g. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Singapore, Thailand, UK and the US). Finally in column 4, we focus on non-Anglo-Saxon countries (French, 
German, Scandinavian-legal origin countries). 
Dependent variable CSR CSR CSR CSR 
 Regulated Sect Non-reg. Sect. Anglo-Saxon Non-Anglo-Sax 
CFP(t-1) 0.018** 
(2.100) 
0.004 
(1.310) 
0.004* 
(1.650) 
0.011 
(1.290) 
Earn_manag 0.168** 
(1.890) 
0.140 
(1.120) 
0.075*** 
(2.500) 
-0.002 
(-0.050) 
R&D_intensity -1.367 
(-0.410) 
0.122* 
(1.620) 
-0.034 
(-0.190) 
0.110*** 
(2.610) 
Ownership_concentration 0.136** 
(2.080) 
-0.028 
(-1.250) 
-0.001 
(-0.040) 
-0.006 
(-0.270) 
Institut_ownership 0.029*** 
(2.370) 
0.021*** 
(4.900) 
0.005 
(0.920) 
0.011** 
(1.850) 
Risk(t-1) 0.249*** 
(2.350) 
0.241*** 
(4.620) 
0.115** 
(2.240) 
0.022 
(0.320) 
Size 1.243*** 
(2.720) 
0.492*** 
(3.810) 
0.281*** 
(2.360) 
0.521*** 
(4.910) 
Leverage 0.140 
(0.820) 
-0.014 
(-0.170) 
0.089 
(1.180) 
0.181** 
(2.200) 
Financial_resources -1.583 
(-0.660) 
0.241 
(0.250) 
-1.135 
(-1.350) 
1.654 
(0.520) 
Constant -0.565 
(-0.530) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.440) 
-0.485*** 
(-9.420) 
-0.305 
(-0.320) 
Number of observations 196 909 819 286 
2R  30.84% 14.16% 30.04% 25.34% 
Fitness Test 4.15 (0.000) 8.36 (0.000) 17.37 (0.000) 4.72 (0.000) 
Hausman Test 32.91 (0.000) 18.79 (0.043) 28.42 (0.001) 42.31 (0.000) 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses. 
  * p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
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TABLE 2C. Robustness: Income Smoothing; Particular stakeholders 
Table 2C shows the results of estimating CSR in terms of earnings management and other control variables 
defined in the text. In columns 1 and 2, we define the variable for earnings management by a measure of 
income smoothing computed as the correlation between changes in accruals and changes in cash flow. In 
column 3 the dependent variable is the score for customer satisfaction, while the score for workers’ 
satisfaction is the dependent variable in column 4. 
Dependent variable CSR CSR Customers Employees 
CFP(t-1) 0.058 
(1.400) 
0.055 
(1.340) 
0.122** 
(2.140) 
0.043 
(1.060) 
Income_smoothing 0.991** 
(1.860) 
0.953** 
(1.800) 
  
Earn_manag  5.484*** 
(2.450) 
4.689** 
(1.980) 
3.812** 
(2.230) 
R&D_intensity 1.703 
(1.480) 
1.827 
(1.590) 
-0.760 
(-0.500) 
1.163 
(1.090) 
Ownership_concentration -0.003 
(-0.010) 
-0.052 
(-0.140) 
-0.683 
(-1.590) 
0.064 
(0.210) 
Institut_ownership 0.036 
(0.550) 
0.035 
(0.540) 
0.166** 
(1.860) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.170) 
Risk(t-1) 1.635** 
(2.060) 
1.621** 
(2.050) 
-1.237 
(-1.330) 
0.989 
(1.490) 
Size 6.559*** 
(3.760) 
7.304*** 
(4.150) 
3.797* 
(1.660) 
-0.562 
(-0.320) 
Leverage (t-1) 0.453 
(0.390) 
0.481 
(0.420) 
1.077 
(0.730) 
1.826* 
(1.740) 
Financial_resources -14.932 
(-1.160) 
-13.699 
(-1.070) 
-37.548** 
(-2.070) 
-26.897** 
(-2.130) 
Constant -2.008*** 
(-3.480) 
-1.910*** 
(-3.320) 
-2.644*** 
(-2.770) 
-2.410*** 
(-3.890) 
Number of observations 873 873 1105 1105 
2R  5.59% 6.78% 2.90% 3.62% 
Fitness Test 3.12 (0.01) 3.44 (0.001) 1.78 (0.054) 21.93 (0.000) 
Hausman Test 21.51 (0.01) 23.95 (0.008) 22.49 (0.021) 29.08 (0.001) 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses. 
  * p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
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TABLE 3: Moderating effect of Earnings management on the CFP-CSR  
Table 3 shows the results of estimating CFP in terms of CSR as well as the variable for earnings 
management and other control variables defined in the text.  
Dependent Variable CFP CFP CFP 
CSR(t-1)   0.049*** 
(2.760 
Earn_manag 0.457*** 
(3.170) 
  
Earn_manag(t-1)  -0.272* 
(-1.720) 
-0.034** 
(-2.780) 
DEarn_Manag*CSR (t-1)   -0.045*** 
(-3.340) 
R&D_intensity -0.217 
(-0.430) 
-0.007 
(-0.010) 
0.176 
(1.050) 
Ownership_concentration -0.082 
(-0.510) 
-0.008 
(-0.040) 
-0.007 
(-0.048) 
Institut_ownership -0.052* 
(-1.620) 
-0.051 
(-1.520) 
0.005** 
(2.050) 
Risk(t-1) -0.135 
(-0.500) 
-0.503 
(-1.470) 
0.225*** 
(5.290) 
Size 2.280*** 
(3.510) 
7.539*** 
(9.270) 
0.219* 
(1.100) 
Leverage (t-1) 1.630*** 
(3.870) 
1.105*** 
(2.310) 
-0.035 
(-0.830) 
Financial_resources 85.369*** 
(48.880) 
122.166*** 
(24.890) 
25.633*** 
(20.890) 
Constant 2.538*** 
(17.650) 
3.139*** 
(16.130) 
0.519*** 
(15.650) 
Number of observations 1105 1105 743 
2R  65.86% 42.39% 64.55% 
Fitness Test 304.84 (0.000) 78.55 (0.000) 46.51 (0.000) 
Hausman Test 127.74 (0.000) 131.94 (0.000) 303.48 (0.000) 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. T-statistics in parentheses. 
  * p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
